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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 24, 2019, the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court decided the most anticipated
intellectual property case of 2019: Iancu v. Brunetti. 2 In 2011, Erik Brunetti applied for federal
registration over his trademark FUCT that was used in connection with various apparel items.3
Erik Brunetti pronounces FUCT as four letters, one after the other: F-U-C-T. 4 The examining
attorney at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), however, thought that FUCT was the past
tense of the work “fuck” and a scandalous trademark. 5 Therefore, the examining attorney denied
Erik Brunetti’s application, citing the Lanham Act’s prohibition against federally registering
“immoral” or “scandalous” trademarks (herein “the immoral or scandalous bar”). 6
After unsuccessfully appealing his case to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB),
Erik Brunetti brought a First Amendment challenge to the immoral or scandalous bar. This
challenge would plunge both the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit)
and the Supreme Court into a sea of uncertainty, showcasing just how underequipped the judicial
system was to decide this case. This article will argue that the Supreme Court was not equipped
to decide this First Amendment challenge because the case contained an inextricable political
question. Specifically, two Baker v. Carr 7 factors are inextricable from Brunetti: (1) lack of

2

Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S.Ct. 2294 (2019).

3

Id. at 2297.

4

Id.

5

In Re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2017).

6

15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) states that “[n]o trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the
goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal register on account of its nature unless it [] consists of
or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter.”

7

369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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judicially discoverable and manageable standards and (2) impossibility of deciding the issue
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.
To begin, this article will briefly explore the history of trademark law from the common
law beginnings until the passage of the Lanham Act 8 in 1905. This historical review is necessary
because it showcases the policy decisions that Congress has made regarding trademark law; it is
these Congressional policy decisions that set the stage for Brunetti over one hundred years before
the Supreme Court decided the case. 9

Next the article will examine Matal v. Tam, 10 the

predecessor case to Brunetti. Tam plays a critical role in an analysis of Brunetti because Tam was
the first case that the Supreme Court decided that involved a First Amendment challenge to a
Lanham provision. 11 Tam centered around the “disparagement” bar of the Lanham Act. 12
The article will then examine the decisions of both the Federal Circuit and the Supreme
Court Justices in Brunetti. The Federal Circuit sided with Erik Brunetti and held that the bar was
unconstitutional because it violated the First Amendment, as the bar impermissibly discriminated
based on content. 13 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, 14 and the majority opinion,
authored by Justice Kagan, also held the bar violated the First Amendment. 15 However Justice

8

15 U.S.C. § 85(a) (1905).

9

As discussed in Part II, Congress made the policy decision to ban the federal registration of immoral or scandalous
trademark in 1905.

10

Matal v. Tam, 137 S.Ct. 1744 (2017).

11

Tam is discussed in Part III, and this paper analyzes the two main opinions: Justice Alito’s opinion and Justice
Kennedy’s opinion.

12

Tam, 137 S.Ct. at 1751.

13

In Re Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1341 (holding “we conclude the provision impermissibly discriminates based on
content in violation of the First Amendment.”).

14

Brunetti, 139 S.Ct. at 2298.

15

Id. at 2302.
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Kagan believed the bar violated the First Amendment because it acted as a viewpoint-based
restriction on expression. 16
Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Breyer, and Justice Sotomayor disagreed with the Federal
Circuit and Justice Kagan; these Justices believed that the term “scandalous” could be read to only
bar federal registration for trademarks that are obscene, vulgar, or profane. 17 Additionally, Justices
Breyer and Sotomayor disagreed with both the Federal Circuit and Justice Kagan on what type of
discrimination to label the bar. Justice Breyer believes the category label is unimportant 18 while
Justice Sotomayor believes the scandalous bar is a form of permissible viewpoint-neutral content
discrimination. 19 These blatant and fundamental disagreements between the Justices highlight the
issue of the judiciary deciding political questions – the judiciary is simply not prepared to decide
them.
After examining the decision of the Federal Circuit and the Justices, this article explains
the history of the political question, highlighting how the Supreme Court has depowered the
doctrine over the last century. Then the article examines the Brunetti decisions under two Baker
factors to argue that Brunetti should have been dismissed by the Supreme Court. By dismissing
Brunetti as a political question, the Supreme Court could right the dangerous notion that the
Supreme Court has the right to decide every case. Instead, the Supreme Court chose to continue
relying on the notion of judicial supremacy. 20

16

Id. at 2299 (“the key question becomes: Is the ‘immoral or scandalous’ criterion in the Lanham Act viewpointneutral or viewpoint-based? It is viewpoint-based.”).

17

Id. at 2303 (Kennedy, J); Id. (Breyer, J.); Id. 2311 (Sotomayor, J.).

18

Id. at 2304 (Breyer, J).

19

Id. at 2311 (Sotomayor, J.).

20

In this article, judicial supremacy refers to the idea that the judicial branch has the power, right, and duty to decide
every case that is before it, regardless of whether the legislative or executive branch are involved.
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The article will conclude by examining the possible implications that the Brunetti decision
has on trademark law. Throughout the opinions of Brunetti, the Justices continuously threaten
trademark owners by severely downplaying the importance of federal trademark registration. This
downplaying could dramatically decrease the value of trademarks and cause trademark owners to
lose their investment in the trademark; or the Justices could cause trademark owners to forgo the
federal trademark registration process entirely. In either of these cases, the public would also
suffer. Federal trademark registration creates the opportunity for the public to choose to purchase
high quality products.

Should trademark holders lose incentive to federally register their

trademarks, trademark holders would have less incentive to create high quality products or services
because they would gain little from federally registering. Thus, the public would be unable to
recognize a product or service as coming from a brand with high or low quality.
Finally, this article discusses how vulnerable trademark law is because the Constitution
contains no provision granting Congress the right to grant trademarks. Therefore, if the Supreme
Court were to continue on the path of using judicial supremacy to decide trademark cases such as
Brunetti, it could eventually be the Supreme Court, and not Congress, that regulates trademarks.
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II. GENERAL TRADEMARK LAW
Trademarks have received important benefits, at common law, since the beginning of the
United States. 21

The oldest reported trademark case in Anglo-American law is known as

Sandforth's Case, 22 and it was decided more than one hundred years before the United States issued
the Declaration of Independence in 1776. 23 While the exact date Sandforth’s Case was decided is
unknown, it was briefly referenced in Southern v. How, 24 which was decided in 1618. 25 In
Sandforth’s Case, a senior cloth maker was found to have a cause of action against a junior
competitor who counterfeited the senior cloth maker’s mark on inferior cloths. 26 Scholars believe
that this case conclusively shows that the English courts, as early as 1584, recognized a common
law right to certain trademark benefits, such as the right to be free from trademark infringement. 27
Despite the early common law start to trademark law, it would take at least 252 years for the United
States to have a federal trademark statute granting similar benefits.

21

See Scandinavia Belting Co. v. Asbestos Rubber Works of America, Inc., 257 F. 937, 941 (2nd Cir. 1919)
(“property in trademarks, exclusive and absolute, has existed and been recognized as a legal possession, which
may be bought and sold and transmitted, from the earliest days of our recorded jurisprudence.”).

22

Keith M. Stolte, How Early Did Anglo-American Trademark Law Begin? An Answer to Schechter's Conundrum, 8
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 505, 506 (1998).

23

Id.

24

Popham 143, 79 Eng. Rep. 1243 (1618).

25

Stolte, supra note 22, at 506.

26

Id.

27

Id.
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A. ACT OF JULY 8, 1870
The first federal trademark legislation was enacted by Congress in 1870. 28 This legislation
attempted to confer exclusive national trademark rights to those who registered their marks with
the United States Patent Office 29. 30 “[A]ny . . . who are entitled to the exclusive use of any lawful
trade-mark or who intend to adopt and use any trade-mark for exclusive use within the United
States, may obtain protection for such lawful trade-mark by complying with the following
requirements . . .” 31 This statute was declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court nine
years later. 32
The Supreme Court thought that Congress relied on Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the
U.S. Constitution to pass the legislation. 33 Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 authorizes Congress to
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” 34 In declaring the
statute unconstitutional, the Supreme Court noted that the legislation gave exclusive rights upon
registration, and the rights did not, “depend upon novelty, invention, discovery, or any work of the
brain. It require[d] no fancy or imagination, no genius, no laborious thought . . . we are unable to

28

Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, §§ 77-84, 16 Stat. 198, 210-12 (can be viewed at:

https://www.loc.gov/law/help/statutes-at-large/41st-congress/session-2/c41s2ch230.pdf).
29

The Act itself is called, “[a]n Act to revise, consolidate, and amend the Statutes relating to Patents and
Copyrights.” Id. Therefore, this legislation is commonly referred to as either the “Patent Act of 1870” or
“Copyright Act of 1870.”

30

Id.

31

Id. at § 77.

32

In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93 (1879).

33

Id. (“it is a reasonable inference that this part of the statute [referring to the trademark provisions] also was, in the
opinion of Congress, an exercise of the power found in that clause of the Constitution.”).

34

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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see any such power in the constitutional provision concerning authors and inventors, and their
writings and discoveries.” 35 The Supreme Court was also concerned that Congress was attempting
to regulate all trade, a power Congress lacked. 36 Therefore, the Supreme Court cautioned Congress
to only create trademark legislation that fell within the Commerce Clause. 37
B. ACT OF 1881
The next federal trademark statute was passed in 1881. 38 Congress confined this state to
trademarks only used in commerce “with Foreign nations or the Indian Tribes.” 39 Thus, the statute
did not apply to interstate commerce. 40 Trademark scholars speculate that the narrow scope of this
statute was a direct reaction to the Supreme Court’s decision in Trade-Mark Cases. 41 This narrow
trademark statute would remain in effect for the next twenty five years. 42

35

Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94.

36

See id. at 96-97 (under the commerce clause, “the power of regulation there conferred on Congress is limited to
commerce with foreign nations, commerce among the States, and commerce with the Indian tribes . . . there still
remains a very large amount of commerce . . . which . . . is beyond the control of Congress. If [an act’s] main
purpose be to establish a regulation applicable to all trade, to commerce at all points, especially if it be apparent
that it is designed to govern the commerce wholly between citizens of the same State, it is obviously the exercise
of a power not confided to Congress.”).

37

Id.

38

Beverly W. Pattishall, The Constitutional Foundations of American Trademark Law, 78 TRADEMARK REPORTER
456, 461-62 (1988).

39

Id.

40

Shontavia Johnson, Trademark Territoriality in Cyberspace: An Internet Framework for Common-Law
Trademarks, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1253, 1264 n.53 (2014).

41

Kenneth Pierce, The Trademark Law Revision Act, 64-MAY FLA. B.J. 35, 37 (1990).

42

Id.
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C. ACT OF FEBRUARY 20, 1905
In 1905, Congress passed the second federal trademark statute. 43 This legislation was the
first time Congress directly and explicitly forbid the registration of “scandalous” and “immoral”
trademarks. 44 Congress made a clear and conscious choice to use this express language. This is
proven by comparing the 1905 statute to the Act of 1881. The Trademark Act of 1881 did not
center around morality; instead, the Act of 1881 simply stated that “no alleged trade-mark shall be
registered unless the same appears to be lawfully used ....” 45 Therefore, Congress made the policy
decision to bar the federal registration of immoral or scandalous trademarks. This policy decision
would remain unchallenged for more than one hundred years. Then Brunetti reached the U.S.
Supreme Court in 2019, 46 and the immoral or scandalous bar would serve as a major disagreement
between the Justices. 47
D. THE LANHAM ACT
The next version of federal trademark statute was the Lanham Act, 48 and the Lanham Act
was signed into law in 1946. 49 This legislation was the first time Congress bared the registration

43

15 U.S.C. § 85(a) (1905).

44

Id. at § 5(a) (“no mark by which the goods of the owner of the mark may be distinguished from other goods of the
same class shall be refused registration as a trade-mark on account of the nature of such mark unless such mark []
(a) Consists of or comprises immoral or scandalous matter.”).

45

See Stephen R. Baird, Moral Intervention in the Trademark Arena: Barring the Registration of Scandalous and
Immoral Trademarks 83 TMR 661, 666 n.15 (1993).

46

See Brunetti, 139 S.Ct. 2294.

47

See discussion infra Part IV.

48

The act was named after its original sponsor, Texas Congressman Fritz Lanham. Pierce, supra note 33, at n.1.

49

Id. at 37.
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of “disparaging” trademarks. 50 The “disparagement” bar would remain unchallenged until the
U.S. Supreme Court decided the constitutionality of the bar in the 2017 case Matal v. Tam. 51 The
original Lanham Act would be subsequently revised by the Trademark Law Revision Act of
1988, 52 but a discussion of the changes is unnecessary for the purposes of this study. 53

III. MATAL V. TAM
To understand the Justices’ opinions in Brunetti, a thorough discussion of Matal v. Tam54
is necessary because every opinion in Brunetti refers to Tam. Thus, a basic understanding of Tam
is necessary to understand the differing Justices’ opinions in Brunetti. Tam was the first case that
the U.S. Supreme Court heard that involved a First Amendment challenge to the Lanham Act, and
this case was decided just two terms prior to Brunetti. 55 In Tam, Simon Tam sought federal
trademark registration of the mark “THE SLANTS” for his musical rock group. 56 The PTO denied
Tam’s application under the “disparaging bar” of the Lanham Act. 57 This bar prohibits the federal

50

15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1946) (prohibiting the registration of marks that “may disparage persons, institutions, beliefs,
or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute”).

51

See discussion infra Part III.

52

See Todd B. Carver, What is the Impact of the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988?, 16 U. DAYTON L. REV. 129,
136 n.32 (1990).

53

For a thorough analysis of the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, refer to Todd Carver’s law review article,
What is the Impact of the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988? Carver, supra note 43.

54

Tam, 137 S.Ct. 1744.

55

Id.

56

Id. at 1747.

57

Id.
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registration of trademarks that may “disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living
or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute.” 58
Tam’s application was denied because “Slants” has historically been a derogatory term for people
of the Asian descent. 59
Tam appealed the denial before the examining attorney and then before the TTAB. 60 Tam
wanted the trademark in hopes to re-appropriate the derogatory term. 61

The denial of his

application was affirmed by both the examining attorney and the TTAB. 62 Tam then appealed the
denial to the Federal Circuit. 63 The en banc Federal Circuit found the disparagement clause was
facially unconstitutional under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment because the bar
engaged in viewpoint-based discrimination. 64 Viewpoint discrimination is discrimination based
on the ideas or opinions the speech conveys. 65 The Government believed the disparagement bar
was constitutional, and thus the Government filed a petition for certiorari which the U.S. Supreme

58

15 U.S.C. §1052(a) (2006).

59

Tam, 137 S.Ct. at 1754 (the examining attorney at the PTO relied, in part, on the fact that many dictionaries
define “slants” or “slant-eyes” as an offensive or derogatory term for people of the Asian decent to reach this
conclusion).

60

Id.

61

Id.

62

Id.

63

Id.

64

Id.

65

Brunetti, 139 S.Ct. at 2299 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829–830
(1995)).
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Court granted. 66 For the first time in history, the Supreme Court had to decide the constitutionality
of a Lanham Act provision under the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. 67
The Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Circuit. Justice Alito, 68 writing for the Court,
came to two main conclusions: (1) the disparagement clause violated the First Amendment because
the bar was viewpoint based; 69 and (2) trademarks are not government speech 70 because
“trademarks have not traditionally been used to convey a Government message . . . [a]nd there is
no evidence that the public associates the contents of trademarks with the Federal Government.”71
This is where the Justices’ agreement ended; the eight Justices 72 divided evenly between two
subsequent opinions written by Justice Alito and Justice Kennedy.
Justice Alito 73 focused primarily on two points: (1) the government’s argument that the
Court’s subsidized speech cases controlled the outcome was unpersuasive; 74 and (2) it was
unnecessary to decide whether trademarks are commercial speech and thus subject to the relaxed

66

Tam, 137 S.Ct. at 1754.

67

Id.

68

Joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan.

69

Id. at 1751 (holding “this provision violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. It offends a bedrock
First Amendment principle: Speech may not be banned on the ground that it expresses ideas that offend.”).

70

This is an important distinction because the “Free Speech Clause ... does not regulate government speech.” Id. at
1757 (citing Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009)). Thus, if trademarks were considered a
government speech, a First Amendment challenge to the Lanham Act would be unsuccessful because the First
Amendment “does not say that Congress and other government entities must abridge their own ability to speak
freely.” Id.

71

Id. at 1760.

72

Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

73

Joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Breyer.

74

The Court’s previous subsidized speech cases involved the Government providing cash subsidies or their
equivalent, while trademark registration requires an applicant to pay a filing fee and continue paying a fee every
ten years to maintain the registration. Id. at 1761 (Alito, J.).
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scrutiny of Central Hudson 75 because the disparagement bar could not withstand even Central
Hudson review. 76 Central Hudson requires that the speech restriction serve a substantial interest,
be narrowly drawn, and not extend further than the interest that it serves. 77 The government argued
that the disparagement clause served two interests. 78 Firstly, the government was interested in
“preventing underrepresented groups from being bombarded with demeaning messages in
commercial advertising.” 79 Secondly, the government was interested in “protecting the orderly
flow of commerce,” which is disrupted by trademarks disparaging race, gender, ethnicity, national
origin, religion, sexual orientation, and similar demographic classification. 80 Justice Alito struck
down both these interests, thus the disparagement bar flunked the Central Hudson test. 81
Justice Kennedy, on the other hand, never mentioned Central Hudson. Instead, Justice
Kennedy82 focused almost exclusively on viewpoint discrimination. 83 For Justice Kennedy, “[a]t
its most basic, the test for viewpoint discrimination is whether —within the relevant subject
category—the government has singled out a subset of messages for disfavor based on the views

75

76

Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
Tam, 137 S.Ct. at 1764 (Alito, J.) (citing Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564-565).

77

Id.

78

Id.

79

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

80

Id.

81

Justice Alito rejected the first interest because “[s]peech that demeans on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender,
religion, age, disability, or any other similar ground is hateful; but the proudest boast of our free speech
jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom to express ‘the thought that we hate.” Id. (citing United States v.
Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929). Justice Alito rejected the second interest because “the disparagement
clause is not narrowly drawn to drive out trademarks that support invidious discrimination. The clause reaches
any trademark that disparages any person, group, or institution.” Id. at 1764-65 (Alito, J.).

82

Joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan.

83

Id. at 1765-69 (Kennedy, J.).
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expressed.” 84 And under this test, Justice Kennedy thought the disparagement bar was “the
essence of viewpoint discrimination” because “an applicant may register a positive or benign mark
but not a derogatory one, [and] the law thus reflects the Government’s disapproval of a subset of
messages it finds offensive.” 85 As the disparagement bar engaged in viewpoint discrimination, it
was irrelevant for Justice Kennedy to determine whether the disparagement clause regulated
commercial speech; 86 regardless of whether or not a government regulation of speech targets
commercial speech, a regulation of speech engaging in viewpoint discrimination must receive
heightened scrutiny. 87
Justice Thomas concurred and chose to write separately because he “continue[s] to believe
that when the government seeks to restrict truthful speech in order to suppress the ideas it conveys,
strict scrutiny is appropriate, whether or not the speech in question may be characterized as
commercial.” 88
The opinions of both Justice Alito and Justice Kennedy’s left two important question
unanswered: (1) whether Central Hudson is the appropriate test for deciding free speech challenges
to provisions of the Lanham Act 89 and (2) whether trademarks are pure commercial speech. 90 As

84

Id. at 1766 (Kennedy, J.).

85

Id.

86

Id.

87

Id. at 1767 (Kennedy, J.).

88

Id. at 1769 (citing Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 572 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment)).

89

Id. at 1764 n.17 (Alito, J.) (leaves open whether Central Hudson is the appropriate test for deciding free speech
challenges to provisions of the Lanham Act); see also id. at 1767 (Kennedy, J.) (same).

90

Id. at 1764 (Alito, J.) (leaves open whether trademarks are commercial speech); see also id. at 1767 (Kennedy, J.)
(same).
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these are important questions for a First Amendment challenge to the Lanham Act, one might
logically assume the Supreme Court would answer them in Brunetti. Or at least discuss them. But
these questions were only considered by the Federal Circuit. The Supreme Court Justices simply
ignored them.

IV. IANCU V. BRUNETTI
Artist and entrepreneur Erik Brunetti owns a street clothing line with the brand name
FUCT 91. 92 Brunetti sought federal registration over FUCT from the PTO for various items of
apparel. 93 The examining attorney at the PTO denied his application, finding FUCT was “the
equivalent of [the] past participle form of a well-known word of profanity [fuck].” 94 The
examining attorney reasoned that because FUCT is the past tense of the vulgar word “fuck,” the
FUCT trademark was scandalous and therefore, Brunetti’s application was denied under the
immoral or scandalous bar of the Lanham Act. 95
This bar prohibits registration of trademarks that “[c]onsists of or comprises immoral,
deceptive, or scandalous matter.” 96 The PTO determines a trademark is barred if a “substantial
composite of the general public” would find the mark “shocking to the sense of truth, decency, or
propriety”; “giving offense to the conscience or moral feelings”; “calling out for condemnation”;

91

According to Brunetti, “FUCT” is pronounced as four letters, one after the other: F-U-C-T. Brunetti, 139 S.Ct. at
2297.

92

Id.

93

Id.

94

Id.

95

In Re Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1337.

96

15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2006).
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“disgraceful”; “offensive”; “disreputable”; or “vulgar.” 97

49

Brunetti appealed the application

rejection before the examining attorney and the PTO’s TTAB to no avail 98. 99
Brunetti then brought a First Amendment challenge to the provision in the Federal
Circuit 100. 101 While Brunetti was on the Federal Circuit’s docket, the Supreme Court decided
Tam. 102 Once Tam was decided, the Federal Circuit requested briefs from each party regarding
the impact Tam had on Brunetti’s case, and oral arguments were heard in August of 2017. 103 The
Government argued that Tam did not resolve the issue of whether the immoral or scandalous bar
was constitutional because the bar was viewpoint neutral while the disparagement bar in Tam
implicated viewpoint discrimination. 104 The Federal Circuit held it was actually unnecessary to
resolve whether the immoral or scandalous bar was viewpoint neutral, however, because the
provision discriminated based on content 105. 106 Speech is restricted by the government based on

97

Brunetti, 139 S.Ct. at 2297.

98

Id.

99

The TTAB found that Brunetti’s mark was “highly offensive” and “vulgar,” in part because Urban Dictionary
defines “fuct” as the past tense of the verb “fuck” and states that “fuct” is pronounced the same as “fucked.” In Re
Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1337. Additionally, because of how Brunetti used the mark, Brunetti’s mark communicated
extreme examples of misogyny, nihilism or violence including dismemberment. Id. Therefore, the TTAB
concluded Brunetti’s mark was vulgar and thus unregistrable under the immoral or scandalous bar. Id.

100

In the alternative, Brunetti argued that (1) the evidence does not support the finding that FUCT is vulgar; (2) even
if FUCT is vulgar, the Lanham Act does not expressly prohibit registering vulgar marks – only immoral or
scandalous marks; and (3) marks should be approved for registration when doubt exists as to the mark’s
meaning. Id. As these arguments are unimportant to this article, they are not discussed further.

101

Brunetti, 139 S.Ct. at 2298.

102

Tam, 137 S.Ct. 1774.

103

In Re Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1341.

104

Id.

105

“Independent of whether the immoral or scandalous provision is viewpoint discriminatory, we conclude the
provision impermissibly discriminates based on content.” Id.

106

Id.
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content when “a law applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or
message expressed.” 107 A statute that restricts based on content must withstand strict scrutiny.108
Strict scrutiny review requires the government to “prove that the restriction furthers a compelling
interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.” 109
The Government conceded that the immoral or scandalous bar is content based speech
restriction, but argued that trademark registration is either a government subsidy program 110 or
limited public forum 111 and therefore, the First Amendment is not implicated. 112 Alternatively,
the government argued that trademarks are commercial speech and should receive “the
intermediate level of scrutiny set forth in Central Hudson.” 113
The Federal Circuit rejected all of the Government’s arguments. The Federal Circuit held
that the grant of trademark registration is not a government subsidy program 114 nor is the grant an

107

Id. (citing Reed v. Town of Gilbery, 135 S.Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015)).

108

Id. at 1342.

109

Id. (citing Reed, 135 S.Ct. at 2231).

110

Under the Spending Clause of the Constitution, Congress has the authority to attach certain condition to the use
of Congressional funds to make sure the funds are used in the manner Congress intended. Id. (citing Agency for
Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 212 (2013)). The Government pointed to Agency and
argued that the immoral or scandalous bar is a reasonable exercise of the government’s spending power because
the bar on registration is simply a constitutional condition that defines the limits of trademark registration. Id. at
1343.

111

“Limited public forums are places [that] the government has ‘limited to use by certain groups or dedicated solely
to the discussion of certain subjects.’” Id. at 1346 (citing Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460,
469 (2015)). When the government opens its property for a limited purpose, the government can constitutionally
restrict speech consistent with that limited purpose as long as the restriction on speech is reasonable, and the
restriction is not an effort to suppress expression simply because officials dislike the speaker’s view. Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). Therefore, the Government argued that federal
trademark registration is a public forum entitling the immoral or scandalous bar to a less demanding degree of
scrutiny. In Re Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1346.

112

Id. at 1341.

113

Id.

114

The Federal Circuit rejected the Government’s argument because Justice Alito’s opinion in Tam reached the issue
and held the government subsidy framework of Agency for International Development does not apply to
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equivalent of a government subsidy115; 116 the Federal Circuit held trademark registration is not a
limited public forum 117; 118 and the Federal Circuit held that “[s]ection 2(a) regulates the expressive
components of speech, not the commercial components of speech, and as such it should be subject
to strict scrutiny 119.” 120
The Federal Circuit then went on to explain that, even if the immoral or scandalous bar was
treated as a regulation of purely commercial speech, it would not survive the intermediate scrutiny
of Central Hudson. 121 This is because three of the four Central Hudson prongs 122 are not met.123

trademark registration. Id. (citing Tam, 137 S.Ct. at 176. (Alito, J.)). “Trademark registration does not implicate
Congress’ power to spend funds. An applicant does not receive federal funds upon the PTO’s consideration of,
or grant of, a trademark.” Id. at 1344.
115

While [the benefits to trademark owners who register their marks] are valuable, they are not analogous to
Congress’ grant of federal funds. The benefits of trademark registration arise from the statutory framework of
the Lanham Act, and the Lanham Act in turn derives from the Commerce Clause.” Id. at 1344-345.

116

Id. at 1342-344.

117

“The registration and use of registered trademarks simply does not fit within the rubric of public or limited public
forum cases.” Id. at 1348. “Because trademarks are by definition used in commerce, the trademark registration
program bears no resemblance to these limited public forums. The speech that flows from trademark registration
is not tethered to a public school, federal workplace, or any other government property.” Id. at 1347.

118

Id. at 1348.

119

The Federal Circuit relied on Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Tam to reach this conclusion. Id. at 1349. In
Tam, Justice Kennedy reasoned that the purpose of trademark registration is source identification, and whether a
mark is disparaging has no plausible relation to the goal. Tam, 137 S.Ct at 1768 (Kennedy, J.). The Federal
Circuit found this logic applies to the immoral or scandalous bar as well; “[a]s in the case of disparaging marks,
the PTO’s rejections under § 2(a)’s bar on immoral or scandalous marks are necessarily based in the
government’s belief that the rejected mark conveys an expressive message—namely, a message that is
scandalous or offensive to a substantial composite of the general population.” In Re Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1349.

120

Id. at 1349.

121

Id. at 1350.

122

Central Hudson consists of a four part test that asks whether: “(1) the speech concerns lawful activity and is not
misleading; (2) the asserted government interest is substantial; (3) the regulation directly advances that
government interest; and (4) whether the regulation is “not more extensive than necessary to serve that interest.”
Id. (citing Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566).

123

Id. at 1351; see also id. at 1353.
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The Court found prong two, the requirement of a substantial government interest, was not met
because the only governmental interest the Federal Circuit could find was “protecting public order
and morality 124.” 125

The third prong, requiring the speech regulation directly advance the

government’s asserted interests, was not met because the immoral or scandalous bar does not
directly stop applicants from using their marks. 126 And the fourth prong, requiring the statute be
carefully narrowed to only serve the governmental interest, is not met because of the PTO’s
inconsistent application of the provision 127. 128
The opinion ends with a discussion of why there are no definitions of “scandalous” and
“immoral” that would preserve the constitutionality of the statute. 129 The concurring opinion
proposes a narrowing of the statute to “obscene marks,” and stated, “[the Federal Circuit is]
obligated to do so.” 130 But, the majority holds, “[i]t is not reasonable to construe the words

124

Ultimately, the Government argued “Congress’ primary interest is the promotion of the use of non-scandalous
marks in commerce.” See Oral Arg. At 22:33-42. The idea that the government has in interest in promoting
certain trademarks over others was unpersuasive, however; “the government has failed to identify a substantial
interest justifying its suppression of immoral or scandalous trademarks.” In Re Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1351.
Additionally, the Federal Circuit found the decision in Tam supports the conclusion that “the government’s
interest in protecting the public from off-putting marks is an inadequate government interest for First
Amendment purposes.” Id. at 1351.

125

Id. at 1350.

126

Id. at 1353.

127

The Federal Circuit supports this conclusion by listing “nearly identical” trademarks that were approved and
rejected, for example, “FUGLY” was registered for use on clothing but refused for registration on alcohol. Id. at
1354.

128

Id.

129

Id. at 1355.

130

Id. at 1359 (Dyk, CJ.).
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immoral and scandalous as confided to obscene materials 131.” 132 The Federal Circuit explained
that “[t]he Supreme Court has made clear that the definition of obscenity for the purposes of the
First Amendment is ‘material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interests’ i.e.,
‘material having a tendency to excite lustful thoughts.’” 133

Further, no dictionary defines

“immoral” or “scandalous” in sexual terms. 134 Therefore, the immoral or scandalous bar could not
be saved. 135 The Supreme Court then granted certiorari. 136
All nine of the United States Supreme Court Justices agreed that the “immoral” bar on
trademark registrations violated the First Amendment. 137 However only six Justices 138 agreed that
the bar on registering “scandalous” violated the First Amendment. Writing for the Court, Justice
Kagan 139 held the immoral and scandalous provision of the Lanham Act discriminates based on

131

The Federal Circuit thought that “an obscene mark would be scandalous or immoral; however, not all scandalous
or immoral marks are obscene.” Id. at 1355. The Federal Circuit likened it to the common phrase, “[a]ll apples
are fruit, but not all fruits are apples.” Id. at 1355-356. Additionally, the PTO previously rejected marks that
were scandalous or immoral that were “clearly not obscene.” Id. at 1356.

132

Id. at 1355-356.

133

Id. at 1356 (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957)).

134

Id.

135

Id.

136

Brunetti, 139 S.Ct. at 2298.

137

Id. at 2295.

138

Justice Sotomayor, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Breyer each wrote dissenting opinions holding they would
allow the “scandalous” bar on trademark registration to stand, but each agreed that the bar on registration for
“immoral” marks was unconstitutional. Id. at 2303 (Kennedy, J); Id. (Breyer, J.); Id. 2311 (Sotomayor, J.).

139

Joined by Justices Thomas, Ginsburg, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh.
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viewpoint 140 independent of the PTO’s interpretation of the statute 141. 142 In deciding the immoral
or scandalous bar was viewpoint based, Justice Kagan relied on one main source – the
dictionary. 143
From the dictionary definitions of “immoral” and “scandalous,” Justice Kagan concluded
the Lanham Act “permits registration of marks that champion society’s sense of rectitude and
morality, but not marks that denigrate those concepts . . . the Lanham Act [also] allows registration
of marks when their messages accord with, but not when their messages defy, society’s sense of
decency or propriety.” 144

Therefore, the immoral or scandalous bar results in viewpoint-

discriminatory application 145. 146 Justice Kagan then went on to reject the Government’s argument
that the immoral or scandalous bar could be viewpoint neutral by a limiting construction of the
statute. 147 Justice Kagan was unconvinced that the Supreme Court should try to construe the

140

“The facial viewpoint bias in the law results in viewpoint discriminatory application.” Id. At 2230.

141

The PTO viewed the “immoral” or “scandalous” bar as a unitary provision, which means the PTO did not treat
the two adjectives separately. Id. at 2298.

142

Id. At 2299.

143

Justice Kagan wrote the definition for “immoral” and “scandalous” according to the Webster’s New International
Dictionary (2d ed 1949). Id. “Expressive material [is] immoral . . . when it is inconsistent with rectitude, purity,
or good morals; wicked; or vicious . . . . [Expressive] material is scandalous . . . when it “giv[es] offense to the
conscience or moral feelings; excite[es] reprobation; or call[s] out condemnation.”) (internal quotations omitted).
Id.

144

Id.

145

Id.

146

To bolster her conclusion, Justice Kagan listed examples of similar trademarks that the PTO has refused to
register and those the PTO has allowed registration for. Id. Justice Kagan explains that the refused trademarks
communicate “immoral” or “scandalous” views on drug use, religion, and terrorism, while the registered
trademarks express “more accepted views on the same topic[s].” Id. Justice Kagan agreed these rejected marks
are understandable because they express opinions that are offensive to many Americans. Id. But she then cited
to Tam to express the notion that “a law disfavoring ‘ideas that offend’ discriminates based on viewpoint, in
violation of the First Amendment.” Id. (citing Tam, 137 S.Ct. at 1751 (Alito, J) and Tam, 137 S.Ct. at 1762-63
(Kennedy, J).

147

The Government wanted to narrow the statutory bar, and the result would be the PTO could only refuse marks
that are “vulgar,” which would be defined as “lewd,” “sexually explicit” or “profane.” Id. at 2301. This
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provision in a way that would render it constitutional because “[t]o cut the statute off where the
Government urges is not to interpret the statute Congress enacted, but to fashion a new one.” 148
Justice Kagan was unconvinced the statute could be saved despite, as Justices Breyer and
Sotomayor point out, Supreme Court precedent warns against interpreting statutes in ways that
would likely made them unconstitutional. 149 Justice Kagan ended her opinion with the sweeping
statement, “the immoral or scandalous bar is substantially overbroad. There are a great many
immoral and scandalous ideas in the world (even more than there are swearwords), and the Lanham
Act covers them all. It therefore violates the First Amendment.” 150
Justice Alito’s concurring opinion does not add much substantive analysis. Justice Alito
believes the immoral or scandalous bar of the Lanham Act discriminates on the basis of viewpoint
and the viewpoint discrimination cannot be removed without rewriting the statute. 151 Interestingly,
Justice Alito also specifies that this decision “does not prevent Congress from adopting a more
carefully focused statute that precludes the registration of marks containing vulgar terms that play
no real part in the expression of ideas.” 152

narrowing removes the viewpoint discrimination, and thus the Government believed the Supreme Court could
uphold the statute. Id.
148

Id.

149

See id. at 2304 (Breyers, J.) (citing Virginia v. American Booksellers Assn., Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 394 (1988)
(holding a law “will be upheld” if it is “‘readily susceptible’ to a narrowing construction that would make it
constitutional.” See also id. at 2313 (Sotomayor, J.) (citing Stern v. Marshall, 654 U.S. 462, 477-478 (2011) and
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937) (“the cardinal principle of statutory construction is
to save and not destroy.”).

150

Id.

151

Id. at 2302-03 (Alito, J.).

152

Id.
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Chief Justice Roberts concurred in part because he agreed that the “immoral portion of the
provision is not susceptible of a narrowing construction that would eliminate its viewpoint bias.”153
Chief Justice Roberts dissented in part, however, because he agrees with Justice Sotomayor that
the “scandalous portion of the provision is susceptible of such a narrowing construction.” 154 The
Chief Justice believes the term “scandalous” can be read more narrowly to bar marks that are
obscene, vulgar, or profane, 155 and a bar on federally registering these marks does not restrict
speech; “no one is being punished” because “owners may [still] use [these marks] in commerce to
identify goods.” 156
Justice Breyer, like Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Sotomayor, believes the “scandalous”
portion of the provision can be interpreted to refer only to “certain highly ‘vulgar’ or ‘obscene’
modes of expression.” 157 To Justice Breyer, the issue is then whether The First Amendment allows
the Government to “rely on this statute, as narrowly construed, to deny the benefits of federal
trademark registration to marks like the one at issue here, which involves the use of the term
‘FUCT’ in connection with a clothing line that includes apparel for children and infants.” 158 He
believes the answer is yes. 159

153

Id. at 2303 (Kennedy, J.).

154

Id.

155

These marks offend only because of their mode of expression. Id.

156

Id.

157

Id. (Breyer, J.).

158

Id.

159

While Justice Sotomayor also comes to this same conclusion, the Justices differ on why the First Amendment
permits the PTO to deny registration to marks such as “FUCT.”
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Justice Breyer disfavors the “category-based approach” taken by Justice Kagan. 160 He
believes the Court should not dwell on categorizing the statute as viewpoint discriminatory,
content discriminatory, commercial speech, or government speech. 161 Instead, he believes the
Court should rely on his opinion in Reed 162 and use following test for the Lanham Act: “[d]oes
‘the regulation at issue wor[k] harm to First Amendment interests that is disproportionate in light
of the relevant regulatory objectives’”? 163 Justice Breyer believes the bar on registering “highly
vulgar or obscene trademarks” creates very little First Amendment harm 164 while the Government
has “at least a reasonable interest” in barring the registration of these marks. 165 Justice Breyer
attempts to bolster the reasonableness of the Government’s interest by citing to scientific studies
that explain “certain highly vulgar words have a physiological and emotional impact that makes
them different in kind from most other words.” 166 He reasons these highly vulgar words threaten
to disrupt commerce, and therefore, the Government has an interest to prevent the use of such

160

Although Justice Breyer never directly states this, he necessarily disagrees with Justice Kennedy’s approach in
Tam as well; Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, concluded that because the
disparagement bar was viewpoint discriminatory, the disparagement bar violated the First Amendment. Tam, 137
S.Ct. at 1765-69 (Kennedy, J.).

161

Brunetti, 139 S.Ct. at 2304 (Breyer, J.).

162

United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Super 8MM. Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973).

163

Brunetti, 139 S.Ct. at 2308 (citing Reed, 576 U.S. at 2235-36) (Breyer, J.). Justice Breyer believes this is the
correct test because a statute that is purportedly viewpoint discriminatory, or subject to strict scrutiny, sometimes
is held to be constitutional after weighing the competing interests involved. Id. For example, a statute stating
that schools can restrict speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug use is constitutional.
See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007). Justice Breyer further explains that Brunetti’s case highlights
the difficulties of categorizing a statute; the Supreme Court has never decided whether the Lanham Act is a
method of regulating pure “commercial speech” or regulating “government speech. Brunetti, 139 S.Ct at 2305
(Breyer, J.).

164

Id. at 2306 (Breyer, J.).

165

The Government’s interest is reasonable, Justice Breyer reasons, because when the PTO registers a mark, “[the
PTO] is necessarily involved in promoting that mark.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).

166

Id.
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words in commerce by denying the benefit of trademark registration. 167 Justice Breyer also
explains the Government “may have an interest in protecting the sensibilities of children by barring
the registration of [highly vulgar] words” because children are more likely to be exposed to the
words. 168 Therefore, “the prohibition on registering scandalous marks does not work harm to First
Amendment interests that is disproportionate in light of the relevant regulatory objectives,” and
this part of the statute should be upheld. 169
The “immoral bar,” however, Justice Breyer believes violates the First Amendment, and
he joins Justice Sotomayor’s opinion because the two “reach the same conclusions, using roughly
similar reasoning.” 170 Justice Sotomayor stands in stark opposition to the majority’s decision. 171
The first divergence is that Justice Sotomayor believes the majority has “ill-advisedly collaps[ed]
the words ‘scandalous’ and ‘immoral.” 172 Instead, Justice Sotomayor believes “[the Court] should
treat them as each holding a distinct, nonredundant meaning, with ‘immoral’ covering marks that
are offensive because they transgress social norms, and ‘scandalous’ covering marks that are

167

Id.

168

Id.

169

Id. at 2308 (internal quotations omitted).

170

Id.

171

According to Justice Sotomayor, “[t]he Court’s decision today will beget unfortunate results;” “the Government
will have no statutory basis to refuse . . . registering marks containing the most vulgar, profane, or obscene words
imaginable.” Id. (Sotomayor, J.). This statement is an interesting juxtaposition to Justice Alito’s opinion.
Justice Alito stated, “[o]ur decision does not prevent Congress from adopting a more carefully focused statute
that precludes the registration of marks containing vulgar terms that play no real part in the expression of ideas.
the particular mark in question in this case could be denied registration under such a statute.” Id. at 2303 (Alito,
J.). The stark disagreement between the Justices showcases how little standards the Supreme Court has for
deciding this issue. It is true that clear and defined legal standards do not always yield agreement from the
Supreme Court Justices. Usually however, the Justices disagree on whether a clear legal standard applies, not
what the standard actually is.

172

Id. at 2311 (Sotomayor, J.).
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offensive because of the mode in which they are expressed.” 173 Justice Sotomayor reaches this
conclusion by analyzing six different dictionary definitions for the word “scandalous.” 174 As each
dictionary provides a different definition, “[t]he word ‘scandalous’ on its own, then is ambiguous:
it can be read broadly (to cover both offensive ideas and offensive manners of expressing ideas),
or it can be read narrowly (to cover only offensive modes of expression.” 175 Therefore, she
believes the limited construction of the “scandalous” provision on the Lanham Act is
appropriate 176. 177
“Scandalous” would then only cover trademarks “when the speaker employs obscenity,
vulgarity, or profanity . . . [and would allow] the PTO to restrict . . . the small group of lewd words
or ‘swear’ words that cause a visceral reaction, that are not commonly used around children, and
that are prohibited in comparable settings.” 178 Following this proper narrowing, the “scandalous
bar” would then be a viewpoint-neutral form of content discrimination that would be
permissible. 179

173

Id. at 2311 (Sotomayor, J.).

174

Id. at 2309 (Sotomayor, J.).

175

Id.

176

Justice Sotomayor further supports her conclusion by analyzing the Supreme Court’s previous actions to shed
light on “what work [] Congress intend[ed] [] ‘scandalous’ to do.” Id. at 2310 (Sotomayor, J.). Justice
Sotomayor explains that Tam decided that the goal of the “disparagement bar” was to prohibit registration of
marks that were offensive because they “derided a particular person or group.” Id. (citing Tam, 137 S.Ct. at
1749). Additionally, the majority in this case held the goal of the “immoral bar” was to prohibit registration of
marks that are offensive because they transgress widely held moral beliefs. Thus, “Congress meant for
‘scandalous’ to target a third and distinct type of offensiveness: offensiveness in the mode of communication
rather than the idea.” Id.

177

Id.

178

Id.

179

Id.
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Justice Sotomayor also disagrees with the majority’s conclusion that the immoral or
scandalous bar is viewpoint discrimination – “[t]o treat a restriction on vulgarity, profanity, or
obscenity as viewpoint discrimination would upend decades of precedent.” 180 Justice Sotomayor
then launches into a discussion of why Cohen v. California 181 does not, as Brunetti argues,
showcase that restriction at issue is viewpoint discriminatory182. 183 Instead, the issue is whether
“prohibiting the registration of obscene, profane, or vulgar marks qualifies as reasonable,
viewpoint-neutral, content-based regulation.” 184 The prohibition is reasonable, Justice Sotomayor
believes, because a trademark registration, “entails Government involvement in promoting a
particular mark. Registration requires the Government to publish the mark, as well as to take steps
to combat infringement . . . the Government has a reasonable interest in refraining from lending
its ancillary support to marks that are obscene, vulgar, or profane.” 185

180

Id.

181

403 U.S. 15, 91 (1971). This criminal case arose from the following facts: Cohen was arrested and placed in
prison under a California disturbing the peace statute because Cohen was wearing a jacket that said, “Fuck the
Draft.” Id. at 16. The Supreme Court held that applying the statute to Cohen because of his jacket violated
Cohen’s First Amendment rights. Id. at 21. The Supreme Court also held that California had engaged in
“viewpoint-neutral content discrimination—it had regulated ‘the form or content of individual expression.”
Brunetti, 139 S.Ct. at 2315 (Sotomayor, J.) (citing Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24-26).

182

Cohen, Justice Sotomayor explains, like Brunetti was subject to content discrimination, and Cohen faced content
discrimination that was viewpoint neutral. Id. However, Cohen takes place in the context of a criminal
prosecution while Brunetti “[was] subject to such regulation only in the context of the federal trademarkregistration system.” Id. Viewpoint-neutral content discrimination is impermissible in criminal prosecution but
is permissible under the framework of either “a limited public (or nonpublic forum” or “a government program
or subsidy.” Id. at 2316-317 (Sotomayor, J.). Justice Sotomayor goes on to argue that whether one chooses the
“limited public forum” or “a government program or subsidy,” “the federal system of trademark registration
fits.” Id. at 2317 (Sotomayor, J.).

183

Brunetti, 139 S.Ct. at 2314-315 (Sotomayor, J.).

184

Id.

185

Id. at 2317 (Sotomayor, J.).
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Justice Sotomayor concludes her opinion by stating, “[f]reedom of speech is a cornerstone
of our society, and the First Amendment protects Brunetti’s right to use words like the one at issue
here.” 186 But, the Government does not need to be “forced to confer on Brunetti’s trademark (and
some more extreme) the ancillary benefit of trademark registration, where “scandalous” in § 1052
(a) can reasonably be read to bar the registration of only those marks that are obscene, vulgar, or
profane.” 187

V. THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE
The Political Question Doctrine refers to subject matter that the Court deems to be
inappropriate for judicial review even though all of the jurisdictional and other justiciability
requirements are met. 188 Although there is an allegation that that Constitution has been violated,
federal courts refuse to rule and instead dismiss the case, leaving the constitutional question to be
resolved in the political process. 189 As explained below, the U.S. Supreme Court should have
found that Brunetti’s case posed a political question and left the issue to be resolved in the political
process.

186

Id. at 2318 (Sotomayor, J.).

187

Id.

188

William Funk, INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: STRUCTURE AND RIGHTS (AMERICAN
CASEBOOK SERIES), (1st ed. 2014).

189

Id.

CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW

62

A. EARLY BEGINNINGS
In the notorious opinion of Marbury v. Madison, 190 Chief Justice Marshall declared that
“[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”191
This one phrase has since been used to elevate judicial power, almost to a seemingly limitless
power to answer all constitutional questions regarding any branch of the government. 192 The issue
is this phrase is sometimes read independently from the entire opinion. The judiciary branch does
not actually have a limitless authority on interpretation of the Constitution; in fact, in Marbury,
Chief Justice Marshall specifically acknowledged that “questions, in their nature political” 193 are
wholly outside the judiciary’s review. 194 When political questions are presented, it is not the
judiciary’s duty to say what the law is, it is the duty of Congress or the Executive. 195
At the heart of the political question doctrine is the Framers’ recognition that “the political
branches possess institutional characteristics that make them superior to the judiciary in deciding
certain constitutional questions.” 196 For instance, the Supreme Court Justices are not elected, and
therefore the Supreme Court is ideal for preserving individual rights without fear of Justices ruling

190

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

191

Id. at 176.

192

See e.g. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (The Supreme Court was able to decide whether the House
of Representative’s refusal to seat Powell was unconstitutional, despite Article 1 § 5 of the US Constitution
stating the Senate is to “be the Judge of the Qualifications of its own Members.”); see also National Federation
of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (Both the President and Congress had signed off on
the individual mandate in the new health care reform law, but the Supreme Court still decided the individual
mandate was unconstitutional).

193

Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 170.

194

Id.

195

Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of
Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 239 (2002) [hereinafter Barkow, More Supreme than Court?].

196

Id. at 240.
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to keep voters happy. 197 But, this independence from the electorate “renders the Court a poor
factfinder and policymaker as compared to Congress and the Executive.” 198 Thus, when a
constitutional question centers around questions of policy, there is sound reason for the Supreme
Court to “defer to the judgment of Congress.” 199
The Supreme Court does not, however, typically defer to the judgment of Congress. Ever
since Marbury, the Supreme Court has gradually given itself more and more power, while
decreasing the power of the political question doctrine. 200 The political question doctrine is at
odds with the Supreme Court’s view of the Court’s interpretive power to decide all constitutional
questions, and it is unsurprising that the Supreme Court has basically abandoned the political
question doctrine. 201 One would be hard-pressed to find a recent Supreme Court case where the
Supreme Court even mentions the political question doctrine, let alone apply the doctrine. The
famous case of Baker v. Carr 202 is a key case that showcases the Supreme Court’s decision to
begin to abandon the political question doctrine.
B. BAKER V. CARR
The Supreme Court decided Baker v. Carr in 1962. 203 At issue in Baker was whether a
justiciable cause of action was presented from a complaint alleging that a state apportionment

197

Id.

198

Id.

199

Id.

200

Id.

201

Barkow, More Supreme than Court?, at 242.

202

369 U.S. 186 (1962).

203

Id.
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statute violated the Equal Protection Clause. 204 The Supreme Court held there was a justiciable
cause of action. 205 In reaching the decision, Justice Brennan discussed the political question
doctrine in great detail and reviewed many political question doctrine cases. 206 Justice Brennan
then used the previous political question doctrine cases to create a list of six factors that courts
should use to evaluate whether a political question is present:
[1] Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving
it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or [6]the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements
by various departments on one question. 207
The Court held none of these factors were present in Baker, and therefore the case could
proceed. 208 Importantly, Justice Brennan stressed that even if one of those factors was present in
the case, the Supreme Court could still theoretically decide the case; “[u]nless one of these
formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there should be no dismissal for nonjusticiability
on the ground of a political question's presence.” 209
Because of this extreme narrowing of the political question doctrine, it is extremely rare
for a Supreme Court majority to hold that issues present political questions. A Supreme Court
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majority has however, found political questions in Gilligan v. Morgan 210 and Nixon v. United
States. 211 Additionally, the gerrymandering issue in Vieth v. Jubelirer 212 was declared a political
question by a Supreme Court plurality. Because of the Supreme Court’s own reasoning in these
three cases, Brunetti should have also been declared nonjudicial because Baker factors two and
three are clearly inextricable from Brunetti’s case.
1. Baker factor three: impossibility of deciding the issue without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion
The Supreme Court has recognized that “courts are fundamentally underequipped to
formulate national policies or develop standards for matters not legal in nature.” 213 But the Federal
Circuit and the Supreme Court did just that in Brunetti; both courts formulated national policy.
The Federal Circuit, Justice Kagan, and Justice Sotomayor filled their opinions with a
variety of dictionary definitions for the words “scandalous” and “immoral.” The Federal Circuit
held the immoral or scandalous bar was not able to be preserved because no dictionary defines
“immoral” or “scandalous” in sexual terms. 214 Additionally, both Justice Kagan’s majority

210

413 U.S. 1 (1973). In Gilligan, the Supreme Court dismissed a lawsuit initiated by Kent State students that
claimed student protesters were killed because of the government’s negligent training of the National Guard. Id.
at 4. Chief Justice Burger explained that “[t]he complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the
composition, training, equipping, and control of a military force are essentially professional military judgments,
subject always to civilian control of the Legislative and Executive Branches.” Id. at 10.
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506 U.S. 224 (1993). In Nixon, the Supreme Court held that whether the Senate could impeach a federal judge
under Article 1, Section 3, Clause 6 was a nonjusticiable political question. Id. at 226. Chief Justice Rehnquist
cited the first two Baker factors – a textually demonstrable commitment to a coordinate political branch and the
lack of judicially manageable standards. Id. at 228.
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541 U.S. 267 (2004). In Vieth, the issue was whether the congressional redistricting plan the Pennsylvania's
General Assembly adopted constituted a political gerrymander in violation of Article I and the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 267. Justice Scalia held that political gerrymandering claims are
nonjusticiable because no judicially discernible and manageable standards for adjudicating the claims exist. Id.
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Japan Whaling Ass’n v. American Cetacean Soc., 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986) (quoting Joseph v. Cannon, 642 F.2d
1373, 1379 (D.C.Cir.1981)).
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opinion and Justice Sotomayor’s dissent opinion reached their conclusions based on the dictionary
definitions for “immoral” and “scandalous.” 215
The issue is that these definitions can change over time; what was “immoral” in the public’s
opinion in the 1900s is not necessarily immoral to the present-day public. For example, in early
patent law, the PTO refused to register gambling machines because gambling was considered
“immoral.” 216 Now, however, Minnesota alone has eighteen casinos. 217 This evidences the idea
that what constitutes “immoral” or “scandalous” is an inherently subjective policy decision that
changes over time with shifts in public taste and morality. These decisions are exactly what the
state and local political process are intended to address. Should the public want action to be taken
regarding “scandalous” or “immoral” material, the public would act during the political process.
But the Supreme Court is insulated from the public, and that is exactly why the Supreme Court
should not have decided this issue. Questions that are “delicate, complex, and involve large
elements of prophecy . . . should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people
whose welfare they advance or imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has
neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility.” 218
By deciding what constituted the correct definition of “scandalous” or “immoral,” the
Supreme Court “interpose[d] its own will above the will of . . . Congress.” 219 The Court could not
215

Brunetti, 139 S.Ct. at 2299 (Kagan, J.); id. at 2309 (Sotomayor, J.).

216

Carl Moy, Moy's Walker on Patents, § 6.15 (2017).
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USA TODAY, List of Casinos in Minnesota, https://traveltips.usatoday.com/list-casinos-minnesota-21749.html
(last visited Nov. 5, 2019).
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Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948). While Southern Air
Lines relates to Executive decisions, this same analysis still applies to Congressional decisions that affect a large
population. The Supreme Court’s decision in Brunetti not only affects trademark owners, but it also affects the
public at large. See discussion infra Part VI.
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make this determination without deciding making a policy decision that disregards the trademark
policy choices that Congress has already made. 220 And when the Justices made these policy
decisions, the Justices relied on standards not legal in nature. Thus, Brunetti is further brought
under the scope of the political question doctrine from the second Baker factor.

2. Baker factor two: lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
As the Supreme Court explained in Vieth, a case is not justiciable unless the court
affirmatively identifies judicially manageable standards for resolving the claims. 221 “One of the
most obvious limitations imposed by [Article III, § 1, of the Constitution] is that judicial action
must be governed by standard, by rule. Laws promulgated by the Legislative Branch can be
inconsistent, illogical, and ad hoc; law pronounced by the courts must be principled, rational, and
based upon reasoned distinctions.” 222
The standards must be available to the Supreme Court at the time of decision, 223 meaning
a case cannot be decided on the assumption that the judicially manageable standards will
eventually become known. Additionally, “[a]ny standard for resolving such claims must be
grounded in a ‘limited and precise rationale’ and must be ‘clear, manageable, and politically
neutral.’” 224 The “standards” used in Tam and Brunetti are anything but a precise rationale or clear

220

This was the line of reasoning the Supreme Court of Nebraska used when determining that what level of public
education the Legislature must provide is a political question. See Nebraska Coalition for Educational Equity
and Adequacy (Coalition) v. Heineman, 731 N.W.2d 164, 183 (2007).
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Vieth, 541 U.S. at 281.
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Id. at 278.
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Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S.Ct. 2484, 2498 (2019) (citing Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306-308 (Kennedy, J.)).
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and manageable. Both Tam and Brunetti thrusted the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court into
“a sea of imponderables,” 225 evidenced by the confusion and disagreement between the opinions.

3. The confusion of the Tam and Brunetti decisions
In Tam, Justice Alito believed that the disparagement bar was unconstitutional, and he
thought it was necessary to explore how the bar could not withstand even Central Hudson review
because the bar extended farther than the Government’s purported interests. 226 Therefore, it was
unnecessary to decide whether trademarks are commercial speech that were subject to relaxed
scrutiny. 227

Justice Kennedy, on the other hand, focused on how the test for viewpoint

discrimination is whether the government disfavors a subset of messages based on the views they
express, and thus a Central Hudson analysis was not necessary. 228 Additionally, Justice Kennedy
believed that, because the bar was viewpoint discriminatory, whether trademarks are commercial
speech was irrelevant. 229 Considering that both Tam and Brunetti faced a First Amendment
challenge to the same section of the Lanham Act, the opinions in Brunetti should bear some
semblance to Tam. But they don’t, and this is because the challenge to the immoral or scandalous
bar lacked judicially manageable standards.
The Federal Circuit held the immoral or scandalous bar impermissibly discriminated based
on content, and the bar was not able to be preserved because no dictionary defines “immoral” or

225

Vieth, 541 U.S. at 290.
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Tam, 137 S.Ct. at 1764 (Alito, J.).
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“scandalous” in sexual terms. 230 Additionally, to answer the Government’s counterarguments, the
Federal Circuit held the granting of trademark registration is not a government subsidy program
or a limited forum, and that the bar was subject to strict scrutiny. 231
Like the Federal Circuit, both Justice Kagan’s majority opinion and Justice Sotomayor’s
dissent opinion reached their conclusions based on the dictionary definitions for “immoral” and
“scandalous.” Justice Kagan believed the immoral or scandalous bar impermissibly discriminated
based on viewpoint while Justice Sotomayor believed the “scandalous” bar was a permissible
viewpoint-neutral content discrimination. Because of the Justices’ heavy reliance on the
definitions of these words, Brunetti is comparable to U.S. v. Nixon. 232
In Nixon, Nixon argued that the word “try” in the Impeachment Trial Clause imposed a
constitutional requirement that the entire senate take place in an impeachment evidentiary hearing,
not just a senate committee. 233 The Supreme Court held that because “a variety of definitions”
could be assigned to the word “try,” the word “lacks sufficient precision to afford any judicially
manageable standard of review of the Senate's actions.” 234 The Court also concluded that there
were no judicially manageable standards for reviewing how the House counted votes. 235
Similarly, there is no way for either Justice to truly discover and manage the standards for what
is “immoral” and “scandalous” because these are not legal terms. These words are common words
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that are used by the public to describe how they feel about certain topics, and there are no judicially
manageable standards for reviewing what definition the public attaches to the words.
Additionally, the Supreme Court is not well-suited to determine whether a trademark is
appropriate or inappropriate. Any judge 236 reviewing an appeal from the decision of the TTAB
simply applies the Lanham Act to the trademark to see if the trademark is registerable or not. 237
The Court will also typically afford deference to the TTAB’s expert knowledge in trademark
matters. 238 As Justice Blackmun’s concurring opinion in Gilligan explains, “[t]he relief sought by
respondents … is beyond the province of the judiciary [because] judicially manageable standards
are lacking” because judges do not regulate the military. 239 The same is true here; judges do not
determine the meaning the public attaches to non-legal words, and judges do not determine
whether a trademark is appropriate or not. There are simply no judicial standards for which Justice
Kagan could have relied on.
Justice Breyer’s opinion mainly focused on how the Government’s interests in preventing
“scandalous” trademark registration outweigh any potential harm from the restriction. Justice
Breyer used two supporting points: (1) scientific studies explain that highly vulgar words have
physiological and emotional impacts that, in his opinion, threaten to disrupt commerce, 240 and (2)
children are more likely to be exposed to vulgar words if the word is a registered trademark. 241
236

When appealing the decision of the TTAB, a trademark applicant may either bring the case before the Federal
Circuit or to federal district courts. See Todd Schneider, Appealing Decisions of Stubborn Examining Attorneys:
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Regarding Justice Breyer’s first point, there is no way of actually measuring this. Justice
Breyer is not a psychologist or an economist that run surveys or impact reports. Additionally, this
type of data is not a standard or a rule. The job of the Justices is to apply the Constitution to the
actions of the Legislative or Executive branch, not determine the effect on commerce that certain
words have on the public. Justice Breyer’s second point is similarly faulted. Firstly, developing
solutions to combat these “scandalous” trademarks in public where the children can see them
should not be the task of the judicial branch. Secondly, whether children actually are more exposed
to these words is not measurable. This is an opinion. Additionally, the Federal Circuit said that
children were not more likely to see these words because the word is a registered trademark. 242
From the sheer amount of confusion between the Federal Circuit and the Justices, it is clear
there were no qualitative, constitutional standards for trademarks that the Supreme Court, or lower
courts, could enforce. And nowhere in any opinion, from either the Federal Circuit or any Justice,
is there an explanation of how these purported standards could be applied in a judicially
manageable way to resolve the issue without making impermissible political judgments.
Therefore, this matter should have been reserved for Congress.

VI.

THE IMPLICATIONS BRUNETTI HAS ON TRADEMARK LAW

It is clear that the Supreme Court has decided that “it alone among the three branches has
been allocated the power to provide the full substantive meaning of all constitutional
provisions.” 243 In the Court’s view, “[e]ver since Marbury, [the Supreme] Court has remained
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the ultimate expositor of the constitutional text.”244 Thus, the Supreme Court has begun to
recognize “only one half of Marbury and ignores the existence of political questions.” 245 But,
Brunetti is the case that should have changed this; the Supreme Court should have recognized
that it would be making a policy determination of a kind clearly not for judicial discretion and
that there were a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving the
issue. Because the Supreme Court failed to find Brunetti was a political question, trademark
holders could potentially face devastating consequences.
A. THE IMPORTANCE OF FEDERAL TRADEMARK REGISTRATION TO TRADEMARK OWNERS
From the opinions in Brunetti, it seems apparent that the Justices severely downplay the
importance of federal trademark registration. The worst offender being Justice Sotomayor’s
dissenting opinion because Justice Sotomayor believes that “[federal trademark registration]
confers a small number of noncash benefits on trademark-holders who register their marks.”246
Justice Sotomayor thereafter refers to the benefits as only “ancillary benefits.” 247 Chief Justice
Roberts’s concurring opinion is not far behind Justice Sotomayor. Chief Justice Roberts explained
that a refusal to register obscene, vulgar, or profane marks does not violate the First Amendment
because “no one is being punished. The owners of such marks are merely denied certain additional
benefits associated with federal trademark registration.” 248
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United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 n.7. (2000). In Morrison, the Supreme Court declared the Violence
Against Women Act as unconstitutional because Congress had exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause.
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While Justice Kagan and Justice Breyer’s opinions do not severely underplay the important
of federal registration, their opinions do not adequately capture how important registration is.
Justice Kagan’s opinion only mentions two benefits of registration: prima facie evidence of the
mark’s validity and “constructive notice of the registrant’s claim of ownership,” which forecloses
some defenses in infringement actions.” 249 Justice Breyer believes trademark registration only
“confers certain benefits upon the owner,” 250 and discusses how business owners are free to use
highly vulgar or obscene words on their products if they are willing to forgo the benefits of
registration. 251
The Justices do not seem to understand that the benefits of federal trademark registration
can be life changing for businesses. It is true, as Justice Breyer pointed out, that business owners
are still able to use a trademark whether or not it is federally registered. But, “while a trademark
owner has an ostensible legal right to use a mark even without registration, the value of this “right”
should not be overstated.” 252 As the Federal Circuit has explained, “it is ‘widely recognized that
federal trademark registration bestows truly significant and financially valuable benefits upon
mark [] holders’—benefits unavailable if federal registration is denied.” 253 In fact, “the incentives
to pursue federal registration . . . are now so significant as to make federal registration
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indispensable for any owner making an informed decision about its trademark rights. A federal
registration is the only rational choice . . . .” 254
“Trademark [r]egistration is significant. The Lanham Act confers important legal rights
and benefits on trademark owners who register their marks.” 255 The benefits a federal trademark
registration confers are numerous:
The holder of a federal trademark has a right to excusive nationwide use of that mark where
there was no prior use by others. Because the common law grants a markholder the right
to exclusive use only in the geographic areas where he has actually used his mark, holders
of a federally registered trademark have an important substantive right they could not
otherwise obtain. Also, a registered mark is presumed to be valid . . . A markholder may
sue in federal court to enforce his trademark, and he may recover treble damages if he can
show infringement was willful. He may also obtain the assistance of U.S. Customs and
Border Protection in restricting importation of infringing or counterfeit goods, and qualify
for a simplified process for obtaining recognition and protection of his mark in countries
that have signed the Paris Convention. Lastly, registration operates as a complete defense
to state or common law claims of trademark dilution. 256
Additionally, a trademark registration serves as “constructive notice of the registrant’s claim of
ownership,” which prevents some defenses in an infringement action. 257 The benefits are only
available to trademark owners who federally register their marks. 258
By downplaying the importance of federal trademark registration, the Justices are
threatening trademark holders everywhere. One of the major purposes of trademark law has
always been to protect a trademark owner’s investment in his mark, 259 and in an ever business-
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centered world, trademarks are one of the most valuable assets a brand can have. In a purely
financial sense, famous registered trademarks like Coca Cola or Microsoft are worth an incredible
amount; the value of Coca Cola is estimated at $72.5 billion dollars 260 while Microsoft is estimated
at a $70.5 billion dollars. 261
The benefits from federal registration, such as the right to exclusive nationwide use, play
a large part in why these trademarks have amassed so much value. When the Justices fail to
recognize how valuable the federal registration benefits are, the Justices could set a precedent that
federal registration is not important. This could, in turn, lead to the devaluation of trademarks and
cause businesses to lose their investment in the trademarks. Or perhaps trademark owners will
forgo the federal registration process entirely. After all, Erik Brunetti fought to get his trademark
federally registered for eight years. That is a big time and financial commitment for trademark
owners to make if the benefits, as the Justices suggest, are only minimal or ancillary. Should
trademark owners forgo federal registration, it would not only be trademark owners that would
suffer. The public would suffer too.

B. THE IMPORTANCE OF FEDERAL TRADEMARK REGISTRATION TO THE PUBLIC
Trademarks are a valuable tool to the public in a competitive, free market 262 because a
trademark guarantees, identifies, and sells the service or product to which it refers. 263 In the

good product.”). A trademark owner invests a substantial amount of time and money into making sure his mark
is of high quality and that the mark identifies high quality goods or services. Id.
260
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microeconomic theory of trademark law, the two main market functions of trademarks are: “(1)
they encourage the production of quality products; and (2) they reduce the customer's costs of
shopping and making purchasing decisions.” 264
Trademarks play a vital pro-competitive role in a modern economy:
Trademarks play a crucial role in our free market economic system. By identifying the
source of goods or services, marks help consumers to identify their expected quality and,
hence, assist in identifying goods and services that meet the individual consumer's
expectations. … [T]rademark counterfeiting … if freely permitted, … would eventually
destroy the incentive of trademark owners to make the investments in quality control,
promotion and other activities necessary to establishing strong marks and brand names. It
is this result that would have severe anticompetitive consequences. 265
Trademarks create responsibility and accountability because trademarks allow consumers
to trace low quality products to their source. 266 As federally registering a trademark allows for a
company to have exclusive nation-wide use, a federal registration can increase the pressure for
companies to have high quality products; if a company’s products are low quality and sold
nationwide, the company would likely have much more negative attention towards their
products. 267 Thus, federal registration of trademarks create an incentive for companies to keep up
a good reputation for quality products. 268 Conversely, without trademarks, consumers would be
unable to trace low quality products to their source. 269
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When the Supreme Court underestimates the value of federal registration, as the Justices
did in Brunetti, the Supreme Court could inadvertently hurt the public. Without the ability to
federally register a trademark, companies would have less incentive to create high quality products
or services because, at a nationwide level, companies would gain little from improving the quality
of the products of services. 270 Consumers would not be able to recognize a product as coming
from a brand with high or low quality, so sales would naturally go to companies that have the
cheapest products, usually resulting in lower quality. 271 Therefore, the Supreme Court could
indirectly take away the public’s ability to choose high quality products.
C. TRADEMARK LAW VULNERABILITY
Trademark law is more vulnerable to the Supreme Court than both patents and copyrights.
Both patents and copyrights exist because the U.S. Constitution expressly grants Congress the
authority to patent and copyright. 272 As noted earlier in part II, the Supreme Court expressly stated
that the Patent and Copyright Clause did give Congress the authority for trademark law. 273 Instead,
Congress regulates trademarks under the Commerce Clause 274 because trademarks are accepted as
being a function of commerce. 275 Therefore, there is no strict constitutional grant for Congress to
regulate trademarks. 276
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Should the Supreme Court continue down the current path of deciding trademark cases
such as Brunetti, it could be the Supreme Court, not Congress that regulates trademarks. In the
most extreme sense, the Supreme Court could eventually decide what trademarks are and are not
allowed, thereby depriving trademark owners of essential benefits of federal registration simply
based on the Justices’ personal opinions. The Justices already proved in Brunetti they have no
qualms about making policy determinations, so perhaps the next trademark case that the Justices
decide will create a policy where a trademark owner is not entitled to federal registration if the
trademark is used in connection with items the Justices disapprove of. As no clear legal standard
exists for deciding First Amendment challenges to trademark statutes, the right case could create
this scenario.
In a less extreme scenario, trademark law could be looking at a situation similar to Garcia
v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority 277 and National League of Cities. 278 In National League
of Cities, the Supreme Court decided, in a sharply divided vote, that the Commerce Clause does
not empower Congress to enforce the provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act relating to
minimum-wage and overtime against the States “in areas of traditional governmental
functions.” 279 Then, nine years later, the Supreme Court decided that Congress could afford San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority employees the protections of minimum wage and
overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act. 280
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In Brunetti, six of the Justices did not like Congress’ ban on immoral or scandalous
trademarks. 281 Three of the Justices thought Congress’ ban on scandalous trademarks was fine. 282
Perhaps the next seminal trademark case decided by the Supreme Court will reaffirm the
constitutionality of a ban on immoral or scandalous trademarks. As Brunetti was decided without
judicially manageable standards, this situation is entirely plausible because a future Supreme Court
could also rely on non-judicially manageable standards to come up with a different result. In any
case, these hypothetical scenarios highlight the uncertainty that trademark owners face. Only time
will tell trademark owners the future of their trademarks.

VII. CONCLUSION
Starting with Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court has set a dangerous precedent – that they
alone have the power to determine what the law is, no matter what circumstances the case arises
under. But this is not the future Chief Justice Marbury imagined for the Supreme Court when he
created the political question doctrine in 1803. Instead, Chief Justice Marbury wanted Congress
to the body that created policy decision. Congress created a policy decision in 1905 to prohibit
the federal registration of “immoral” or “scandalous” trademarks. But the Supreme Court
Justices took the matter into their own hands and made their own policy decision. They made
this policy decision while insulated from the election that Congress members. These elections
are held to ensure that Congress is making policy decisions that the public wants. In addition,
when the Justices made their policy decision, the Justices relied on standards not legal in nature.
Thus, Brunetti is further brought under the scope of the political question doctrine.
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Instead of applying the political question doctrine to Brunetti, however, the Justices
simply “took for granted that they had the ‘responsibility to resolve the federal and constitutional
issues the judicial system has been forced to confront.” 283 But the Supreme Court should not
have decided Brunetti. To make matters worse, in deciding Brunetti, the Justices threatened the
security of trademark owners by downplaying the importance of federal registration. Without a
federal registration, a trademark holder cannot access extremely valuable benefits, such as
exclusive nationwide use and the help of U.S. Customs and Border Patrol in restricting the
importation of infringing or counterfeit goods. By downplaying these benefits, the Supreme
Court could inadvertently take away the public’s ability to choose to purchase high quality
products. And finally, if the Supreme Court were to continue on the path of deciding trademark
cases such as Brunetti, it could eventually be the Supreme Court, and not Congress, that
regulates trademarks.
The Supreme Court had a chance to fix the dangerous notion of judiciary supremacy. But
instead, the Court forged ahead, giving little regard to the decisions that Congress had already
made. As a consequence, trademark owners everywhere, and the public, could suffer.

283

Barkow, More Supreme than Court?, at 243 (citing Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000)).
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